

tific prejudices, and must be consigned to the rubbish heap of discarded superstitions. This attitude is widespread among other contemporary charlatans peddling nostrums, like Robert Ardrey, Marshal McLuhan, and C. D. Darlington.

The subsequent chapters of this volume also bear titles which have little relationship to their contents: Chapters 2 to 6 are called "Freedom"; "Dignity"; "Punishment"; "Alternatives to Punishment," and "Values." It is clear that Skinner does not like the first three, although there is no evidence that he understands the meaning of the first two and the last. In each case, unsupported dogmatic statements are made, the real issue is avoided almost totally, and the chapter consists very largely of examples of the things Skinner refuses to recognize, interspersed with numerous quotations from or references to famous writers (but almost never to psychologists). These are mostly irrelevant to the subject, but are included, it would seem, to impress us with Skinner's erudition. Although the volume has neither index nor bibliography, it does have numerous notes, many to eight books by Skinner himself. The first such note, on page 1, is to C. D. Darlington's "The Evolution of Man and Society," but Skinner has not read the book and took the quotation from a review of it in Science for June 12, 1970. Darlington is about the last person Skinner should quote, for he is a believer in genetic determinism, while Skinner is an environmental determinist, who quotes Darlington on environmental damage, something which has quite different meaning to the two men. But perhaps they find kinship in their common belief that man is unfree in a deterministic condition.

The quality of Skinner's thought may be seen in the opening words of his chapter on "Freedom," "Almost all living things act to free themselves from harmful contacts. A kind of freedom is achieved by the relatively simple forms of behavior called reflexes. A person sneezes and frees his respiratory passages." To most of us sneezing would be an example of freedom only if we had some control over it and some choice as to whether we sneeze or not. The quotation is a good example of Skinnerian thought for three reasons: First, because it refers to an involuntary unfree action as an example of "a kind of freedom"; second, because he makes this error partly because of his bias for reflex actions and from his constant tendency to use words in incorrect meanings; and third, because the opening sentence is obviously untrue, but Skinner's experience and frame of reference is so remote from the real world that he is unaware of its falseness. It may be true of amoebas or rats that they avoid harmful contacts, but it is obvious to anyone who comes out of the laboratory to look at the actual world that men do not avoid, but, on the contrary, seek out, "harmful contacts" like drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, speed, violence, over-powered cars, and all kind of disturbances and excitements. In fact, the central problem of psychology today is why men seek these things. The obvious answer is that they are frustrated and bored, but Skinner's assumptions have no place for these ideas (being internal they are "unscientific"), so he has to deny that they even occur.