THE HOLISTIC, MORPHOLOGICAL, AND COGNITIVE QUALITIES OF CARROLL QUIGLEY'S HISTORIOGRAPHY

Gienn E. Bugos Introduction to Historiography and Historical Method January 12, 1982

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There is truth and it can be found; it has been found, to some degree, by men in the past, and by men in other societies. The task of finding it is life-long, and probably continues after bodily death. And the greatest joy of living is the search for it. That is why we are here.¹

Carroll Quigley seldom used terms such as "truth" in his academic works. Forever scientific, even in his discussions of abstract and moral concepts, he preferred to use the more easily definable term "Cognitive sophistication" to explain his educational goals. Quigley felt that each person had a cognitive system that classifies, critiques, and prioritizes all the phenomena one encounters, and when one is able to regognize one's own unconscious cognitive prejudices by comparing cognitive systems with the systems of other people in other times, one is then cognitively sophisticated. Quigley's goal as an academician, then, became that of making Western man aware of his cognitive assumptions by constantly critiquing this cognitive system from every possible perspective. The all-encompassing nature of the critique, the necessity of recognizing perspectives, and the personal force with which "The Great God Quigley" presented his theory makes his biography an important factor in understanding his historiography.

Born to upper-middle class Irish Catholic in 1911, Quigley developed a strong sense of ethnicity and community that greatly influenced his concepts of community and culture. 2 He showed early academic progress at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Carroll Quigley, "Education and the Academic Process," memorandum to the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Dean's Office, 1971, p. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Quigley, "Letter to the Editor", Washington <u>Post</u>, October 26, 1974.

winning newspaper. His early interests, however, were in science and mathematics where When he entered Harvard University his declared major was biochemistry. His early immersion in scientific method profoundly influenced his approach to history, which he adopted as his field of study before graduating magna cum laude in 1933. He continued his studies in European history at Harvard, receiving his A.M. in 1934 and his Ph.D in 1938 with a dissertation on the Risogimento during the Napoleonic era.

His education, however, continued as he presented his historiography in numerous lectures to students whose critique compelled him to recognize that his way of looking at the world was "not necessarily the only way, or even the best way to look at it". During his three years as a tutor in history and government at Princeton and Harvard Universities and his 3 5 years as a Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, he gained insight into the psychological structure of modern society and developed a reputation as an outstanding teacher. His course on "The Development of Civilizations" was cited by School of Foreign Service Alumni from 1941 to 1969 as the most influential course in their undergraduate careers and received four faculty awards for distinguished teaching. His years of teaching compelled him not only to constantly reexamine his historiography, but to produce lectures general in approach, which provided the base for his two major works, The Evolution of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Quigley, <u>Tragedy and Hope:</u> A History of the World in Our Time (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. xi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Obituary of Carroll Quigley, Washington Star, January 6, 1977.

<u>Civilizations</u> and <u>Tragedy and Hope</u>, thereby facilitating the expression of his generalist history. By 1971, he had a very clear idea of where his responsibilities and curiosity had led him; "I am a 'macrohistorian' specializing in the processes of change in advanced societies, with a special interest in methodological questions".<sup>5</sup>

His generalist approach to history necessitated his keeping abreast of many academic disciplines, which he did through membership in the American Anthropological Association, the American Economic Association, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Historical Association as well as serving as a consultant to the Department of Defense and the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. But Quigley's interdisciplinary interests resulted not from dilletantism, but from a distrust of reductionism as a means of understanding society and an insatiatiable curiosity he synthesized into a revolutionary holistic epistomology.

Quigley's explanations of his historiography changed during the tumultuous 1960's as new scientific and psychological concepts were introduced that aided him in clarifying his definitions. However, he continued to practice a holistic scientific historiography towards a moral goal of global peace and understanding through cognitive sophistication. To understand this unique historiography, one must first understand its roots in the scientific methodology of what has come to be known as "general systems theory." Quigley's wide-ranging knowledge of numerous civilizations gave him material from which to discern patterns

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Quigley, "Assumption and Inference on Human Origins", <u>Current Anthropology</u> 12 (October-December 1971): 536.

in the system of evolution of civilizations, allowing him to extend his general systems theory to "morphological history." Then, by critiquing contemporary society in the context of his morphology of history, Quigley sought to bring about a revolution in thinking.

Always the teacher, Quigley emphasized the study of tools of analysis to develop a useful epistomology. In which he always retained his belief in the scientific method. Quigley's explanation of scientific method as an analytical tool in the social sciences is original with him only in that he recognized the real limitations of the physical sciences, as opposed to the scientific extremism of Langlois and Seignobos. The scientific method Quigley subscribed to consists of gathering evidence, making a hypothesis, and testing the hypothesis.

The laws arising from the use of scientific method in both the physical and social sciences are idealized theories reflecting observed phenomena only approximately, but Quigley felt laws must be based on observation and must be amended to account for any observed anomolies. After these laws were scientifically constructed, Quigley used them as conceptual paradigms to explain historical phenomena through comparison, in contrast to rationally derived laws of the theorists which will not adapt to anomolies of observation. "Theory must agree with phenomena, not vice versa." Thus, Quigley puts the historian at ease with scientific methods by explaining that physical laws have as many exceptions as the historicists claim historical laws do.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), p. 33.

Quigley, "Assumption and Inference on Human Origins", 538.

Quigley's methodology emphasizes observation as a technique because the inconclusive nature of historical observation makes any attempt to establish laws impossible. He also demanded that the historically "observed" phenomena eculd be authenticated and verified in a scientific fashion, although in his sparsely footnoted works he always emphasized the synthesis of all the observations and not the authenticity of any one fact. 8 As more evidence is observed, scientists seek "advances by a series of successive (and one hopes, closer) approximations to the truth."9 Thus, only the communal effort of scholars can achieve the truth. Observations are then synthesized into hypotheses which must explain all the observations in the simplest way possible. Simplicity in the sense that the hypothesis makes the fewest assumptions and inferrs the simplest relationships actually makes the hypothesis scientific. And it is simpler to prejudge that a hypothesis is invalid until proven valid through checking back for evidence, foretelling new observations, and by experimenting with controls, to complete the method of propounding tentative paradigms.

Quigley's quest for simplicity in history, bonever, did not preclude his recognition of its complexity. Instead of surrendering to historical complexity as an insurmountable obstacle and retreating to an historicism that would obviate the development of paradigms, Quigley confronted complexity head-on and sought to recognize it as an integral part of historical method. He realized that while reductionism is possible with the physical sciences, any attempt at dissecting an historical phenomena and isolating and analyzing only one factor as an independent variable is impossible in the social sciences. Thus, Quigley

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Quigley, "Falsification of a Source in Risorgimento History," <u>Journal of Modern History</u> 20 (September 1948): 223-26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Quigley, <u>Evolution of Civilizations</u>, p. 34.

studied the whole context of a phenomena, a method developed by the theoretical biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy termed "gieneral systems theory." 10 This "generalism" became known as "holisticism" and operationalized as "macrohistory." By "holisticism", Quigley meant that the "whole" of reality held greater meaning than the sum of its parts, thus scholars should tend towards general studies to understand general and comparative historical concepts and paradigms rather than the hyperspecialization pervading the discipline of history. 11

Other generalists Quigley respected were Kenneth Boulding and Robert Solo in economics, Amitai Etziani in sociology, and William McNeill, Frederick William Maitland, and Charles McIlwain in history. He felt these academicians were top-quality generalists because they had a clear system of values rooted in the Western Hebreo-Christian tradition and a sophisticated understanding of epistomology. 12

Here Quigley shows the profound influence the teachings of the founders of the Western Hebreo-Christian tradition had on his own cognitive system. Quigley found the "medieval synthesis" of Occam's holism with the moderate realism of Abelard and Thomas Aquinas as the root of the Western intellectual tradition which triumphed over the exaggerated rationalism of the Platonists. It was not a complete triumph, however, and Western epistomology developed with a moderateness and duality of accepting both rationalism-materialism and religiosity-holisticism whenever a situation requires a certain way of thinking. 13

<sup>10</sup> Ludwig von Bertalanffy, <u>General System Theory: Foundations</u>, <u>Development</u>, <u>Applications</u> (New York: <u>George Braziller</u>, 1968).

<sup>11</sup> Quigley, "Public Authority and the State in the Western Tradition: A Thousand Years of Growth, 976-1976, <u>The Oscar Iden Lectures</u> (Washington: Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 1977), p. 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>An unpublished article for the Georgetwôn University <u>Hoya</u>, ca. 1972, p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Quigley, <u>Evolution of Civilizations</u>, p. 346.

This "medieval synthesis" added two dimensions to the rationalist's special and three-dimensional materialist configuration of human experience, the two dimensions of time and of abstraction. Even this fifth-dimension of time is divisible into chronologically sequential levels of evolution, namely physical evolution (the materialist, three-dimensional stage), organic evolution (as the physical elements combine for survival), and social evolution (as the organism becomes more complex, as on the level of states, and the society molds the personality of the individuals within it), which leads to the increasing sophisticated levels of cognition, the emotional, spiritual, and rational levels. <sup>14</sup> Man is a consequence of this process of evolution, and therefore, so is his history.

Quigley felt that as Western man becames more cognitively sophisticated and is more able to determine his hierarchy of needs according to these levels of abstraction, then he will overcome the exaggerated rationalism of the historical methodology of the 19th century. In a table prepared for a conference on the philosophy of history contrasted the catchwords of the historical methodology of two eras:

<u>1880</u>	<u>1980</u>

reductionist holist. isolation of problem contextual specialist generalist ecological analytical quantification qualification seeking laws making models network causation chain-causation technicians scientists knowledge understanding

Quigley notes the evolution of historical methodology to the more sophisticated modern approach but would disagree that it is the final,

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Quigley, "Structuring History" (1971) mimeographed.

immutable approach. He feels Western man's realization that all present knowledge (in his case of epistomology) will be superceded in the future and will save Western society from dissolution or stagnation from within while allowing innovation for growth. Thus, Western man's epistomology, because of its future preference and scientific deviation, is an important factor in the development, control, and future prospects of the powerful Western civilization, just as the epistomology of past civilizations hindered their ability to cope with the changing physical world and thus was an important factor in their demise. 16

But epistomology also played a dominant role in determining several other aspects of life. As with all of Quigley's concepts, however, "epistomology" must be clearly defined before its role in shaping history can be understood. The operational definition Quigley gives "epistomology" is "cognitive system" that is, the ways in which "the language of a society classifies human experience in order to think or to communicate and the values which a particular society puts upon these categories, determining the most fundamental engines of human motivation." The generic morphology of a cognitive system consists of those five levels on the continuum of the fifth dimension of abstraction, that is, feelings, emotions, self-awareness, rationality, and spirituality.

In his book <u>Tragedy and Hope</u>, <u>Base</u> examines the categories and valuations of human experience along this continuum of abstraction by man in Western society in order to show how this cognitive system was a precondition to the economic and military development of Western society, as well as to the seeds of disintegration it planted which reach fruition in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Quigley, <u>Tragedy and Hope</u>, p. 1233.

<sup>17</sup> Quigley, "The Creative Writer Today," <u>Catholic World</u> 206 (December 1967): 111-112.

two world wars sandwiching a global depression. Given time, Quigley would have investigated the cognitive system of each civilization in history along this conceptual paradigm exhibited in the Western system so that we could truly understand that society. This is because the society's cognitive system "is the most important we can know about any society and the most difficult to learn. It is also difficult to recognize that we ourselves have a cognitive system, a distinctive way of looking at the world that is not the way the world actually is, but is simply the way our group conveniently looks at the world." Quigley's recognition that scientific method engenders a morphology or pattern in which we have always and will always perceive human experience provides the transition to what he terms "historical analysis", that is, a cognitive system specific to the task of understanding human experience through historical paradigms. Whereas scientific methods can provide Western man with an all-purpose epistomology with which to assess and react to any given situation, the scientific method when applied to the historians task of developing historical paradigms is afforded the added sophistication of the perspective of time Quigley's fourth dimension of human experience), and thus is closer to achieving the true aim of the human experience, that of understanding human experience.

Quigley that general and morphological history were necessary to develop the conceptual paradigms to understand historical phenomena. Quigley believed that every event, every human expereince is unique and "occurs at a certain place, at a certain moment, to persons at a specific age and condition and in an arrangement of all these which will never be

<sup>18</sup> Quigley, "Needed: A Revolution in Thinking," National Education Association Journal 57 (May 1968): 42.

repeated." 19 And to a certain extent, an historical interpretation is unique to certain configuration of conditions which bias its findings, such as nationalism-biased sources in Risorgimento history, or as academic specialists isolate one historical factor as an independent variable to protect and enhance the worth of their particular discipline. Quigley felt the inexorable accrual of knowledge would obviate belief in historical relativism. More importantly, Quigley denounced historians who carried relativism to extremes because he felt they exaggerated rationalism in scientific method to make it appear ridiculous. 20

Quigley exemts were unique, but that events form patterns, which can be perceived, conceptualized, communicated, and understood, but only to the degree that they are not unique. In this sense, Quigley is a comparative historian searching not for the unique character of civilizations, but for resemblances, much like the historias of medieval Catholicism and Leopold von Ranke who seek a "Universality" in the past. The most important area of commonality unique events can share is if they both involve a given society. Events that can be examined in the context of a given society give insight into Vlife cycle of that society, thus allowing it to serve as an historical paradigm. For Quigley, a society is more than a well-defined aggregate of people, rather, it "is a group whose members have more relationships with one another than they do with outsiders. As a result, am society forms an integrative unity and is comprehensible."21 The unity of interrelationships within this society operationalizes itself to the historian in the form of culture, or if the interrelationships make the society a producing and expanding one, then it is also operationalized in the form of civilization.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Quigley, Evolution of Civilizations, p. 296.

Perhaps the single most important factor making Quigley's historical more useful analysis sounder than those of other historians who studied the lifecycle of civilizations, namely Giovanni Battista Vico, Nikolai Danilevsky, Oswald Spengler, and especially Arnold J. Toynbee, is that Quigley readily defined his historical concepts and terms. His definitions of concepts. like Leontief's Input-Output analysis of a modern economic system, recognizes that all elements in a general system are dynamic and that the definition of any element must be contextual rather than denotative. The earlier historians often saw Classical antiquity as the prime example of historical culture, society, and civilization although Quigley shows that it encompasses a number of anomalies from the historical paradigms he deliniates. 22 Whereas these historians used simplistic biological and Darwinian terms as analogies to the life cycles of civilizations, Quigley perhaps parkages drew upon his more sophisticated understanding of anthropology, sociology and psychology to deliniate his concepts more clearly.

His definition of "culture" in <u>The Evolution of Civilizations</u> is one such notable concept. It is a multifaceted definition, stating:

"From one point I view (culture) is the cushion between man's purely animal nature and the natural environment. From another point of view it is the social heritage passed down from generation to generation. From another point of view it is a complex medley of personalities, material objects, patterns of behavior, subtle emotional relationships, accepted intellectual ideas and intellectual assumptions, and customary individual actions. From any point of view it is constantly changing, and forms the chief subject of study in all the social sciences."

To reproduce and survive, societies must act as a buffer between the human infant and his physical environment and must train that infant to become a productive and acceptive member of that society. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup><u>Ibid</u>., pp. 59-60.

acculturization during the training process is what transforms the vast spectrum of his human nature (the sum of his potential qualities) into the much narrower spectrum of his human personality (actually developed qualities). Culture would therefore equal artifacts plus organization into patterns of actions, feelings, and thoughts among persons and artifacts. Thus, while a basic human need is food, it is the culture that determines beef and broccoli are foods as opposed to locusts and seaweed. This added influencing dimension of culture on the human personality differentiates man from beasts, who have only their natural environment to shape their personality because they can survive without culture. Quigley, with his scientist's passion for diagrams, display the human interrelationships as follows: 24

The hereditary aspect of culture makes it "integrative" which means that the different parts of a culture adapt themselves to one another and tend to become  $\hat{V}$  increasingly integration interlocking unified system in which each part fits snugly into all the surrounding parts. But because culture is made up of loose-fitting parts that are only partially adapted to one another, and to the adjacent influence of the environment and human needs, it is both adaptive and persistent and thus serves as a trigger mechanism to keep the three circles operating in coordination.

In this model of interrelationships, human nature certainly shapes the culture but in a very nebulous manner which social scientists have difficulty observing. They can more easily observe how the culture shapes human potentialities into human personality. While Quigley

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 64

deliniates the generic factors comprising human personality along his five level continuum of abstraction, the most important are those one thinking on the "rational" level should consider. This division of human needs into a hierarchy of levels from the more abstract to the more concrete parallels the division of the elements of culture and are here presented with their operational definition: <sup>25</sup>

8	Intellectual	Rational Explanations and Communication	
7	Religious	Psychic Certainty	Internal
6	Emotional	Existential Relation with Nature and People	Controls
5	Social	Gregariousness	
4	Economic	Energy, Materials	
3	Political	Domestic Tranquility	External
2	Military	Foreign Security	Controls
1	Physical	Space, time, oxygen	

Quigley considers the fulfillment of these factors a similarity shared by all civilizations and thus important to discerning historical patters.

To the degree that a civilization is able to fulfill these fundamental needs, it is able to exert control over the people that comprise the society, either through controls of acculturization internalized in the psyche of the individuals which comprise that civilization, or more concrete controls, such as economic and military leverage, which are external to the individuals in a civilization and imposed upon them through some societal process located in another level of the culture. This is known as morphological tension. For instance, a change on the intellectual level exacerbating the separation of man from nature on the emotional level could lead to that culture's inability to satisfy needs on the physical level if this culture has the economic infrastructure to manifest that change which started on the intellectual level. Thus, Quigley showed that cultures

 $<sup>^{25} \</sup>rm Quigley, '' Notes to Papers Presented at American Association for the Advancement of Science Meeting,' Washington, D. C., 1972.$ 

satisfy human needs by socializing them into human desires along a complex nexus of societal (and historical) factors.

This description of culture by its functions is more than a temporalized physiocracy  $\exp_A^{\alpha\mu}$ nding needs as the driving force in history; indeed the needs a culture must satisfy, with the exception of those on the physical level, result primarily from the culture's cognitive system. Nevertheless, Quigley's major contribution to historiography was in his analysis of the evolution of civilizations, and in this analysis he determined that the culture's ability to create needs it can fulfill is the primary factor transforming that culture into a civilization. Quigley defines "civilization" as "a producing society with an instrument of expansion." Seventeen societies meet this definition of civilization, including the two currently existing Western and Orthodox (Russian) civilizations. Each of these civilizations had a unique culture and a surplus producing instrument of expansion.

The earliest civilizations depended on their proficiency in growing a carbohydrate plant as an energy food and can be classified into the maize, rice, and grain groups. However, this dependency is only part of the spatial dimensions, which along with time and abstraction, comprise the matrix on which all civilizations are found. Quigley saw the matrix of early civilizations influenced primarily by geographical and meteorological changes in man's prehistory. The demographic flows and agricultural systems resulting from these changes found the matrix of subsequent civilizations, although the evolution of the instrument of expansion makes the civilization historically unique.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Quigley, Evolution of Civilizations, p. 142.

Quigley defines the spatial dimensions of the matrix of civilization in terms of geography, the abstract dimension as the cognitive system embodied in culture, and the dimension of time in terms of continua of phenomena. Quigley shares Marc Bloch's fascination with time as that perspective which makes history a unique and fruitful discipline. Quigley's continuum in the context of history is:

"a heterogeneous unity each point of which differs from all the surrounding points but differs from them by such subtle gradations in any one respect that no boundaries exist in the unity itself, and it can be divided into parts only by imaginary and arbitrary boundaries."<sup>27</sup>

He uses the example of the colors on the prism to explain the irrational quality of space; orange is not a single, definable color on the prism but rather the gamut of colors between red and yellow. Because only a rational and logical construct of the spectrum could produce colors that are both definable and comeasurable. Quigley denounces attempts to use mathematical rationalism to determine the periodizations of historical paradigms. But history deals with changes and all changes, occuring in time involve continua. Thus, the practice of slicing continua into periods or dual poles and giving names to these articicial categories is necessary if one is to think or talk about the world. However, one must always remain alert to the danger of believing that those terms are real or refer to reality except by rough approximation. But "only by making such divisions can we deal in a rational way with the many nonrational aspects of the world."<sup>28</sup> And Ouigley sought to elucidate as many divisions as necessary by approximating dates for all revelant phenomena and transitionary periods.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 98.

Thus, added to the five-dimensional continuum of human experience and the eight-leveled continuum of human needs and cultural tasks, is a seven-stage civilization life cycle along a continuum of time. To comprehend this continuum, "the periodization should, ideally, depend on the causes of the cultural changes."29 Whereas Toynbee, Spengler, and Vica saw change resulting from Darwinian strife, Quigley sought to understand the patterns in the conditions causing the strife. Ouigley saw the strife occuring at the point where a social instrument becomes an institution and fails to respond adequately to societal needs. An instrument is a social organization that is fulfilling effectively the prupose for which it arose, to satisfy one of the eight basic human needs of the individuals in the society. An institution is an instrument that has taken on activities and purposes of its own, separate from and different from the purposes for which it was intended, and as a consequence it achieves its original purposes with decreasing effectiveness. That is, in an institution the organizational relationships become ends in themselves to the detriment of the ends of the whole organization.

Quigley clarifies the evolutionary process leading inexorably to tension as the aggregate of the process transforming instruments into institutions, process pervading all social phenomena. As human needs are left unsatisfied by institutionalization, struggle ensues between a group of discontents seeking to overthrow the institution and a vested-interest group seeking to continue benefitting from the institutionalization. This struggle is called the "tension of development" and from this tension and its ensuing controversy there may emerge any one of (or combination) among three possible outcomes: reform, in which the institution is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 128.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Ibi<u>d</u>., p. 115.

reorganized and its methods of action are changed to become more of an instrument; circumvention, in which the institution is left with its privileges and vested interests intact, but its duties are taken away and assigned to a new instrument in society; or reaction, in which the vested interests triumph and the people of that society are doomed to ineffective achievement of their needs on that level for an indefinite period. Thus, historical development is concerned with the changes that take place on any single level of culture in a society.

This process of historical development takes place on innumerable levels of a society because there are innumerable levels to the culture. But "historical evolution" results from both historical development and "historical morphology", both acting simultaneously and reacting on each other. "Historical morphology" is concerned with the structures and the relationships between the different levels of society. Because of these structural interrelationship between the levels of the culture, there is an optimum point of historical development on each level of culture. When each level in relationship to the development of each other level is at the optimum point where morphological tension between the levels is minimal, then that society is responding to needs with the most efficient resource expenditure. Having established that the evolution of a society is a resultant of the two kinds of change termed development and morphology, Quigley can then concentrate on the historical evolution of a certain type of society, the civilization.

The pattern of change in civilizations Quigley presents consists of seven stages resulting from the fact that each civilization needs an instrument of expansion, which becomes an institution. The civilization

rises while this organization is an instrument and declines as this organization becomes an institution. By "instrument of expansion", Quigley means that the society must be organized in such fashion that it engenders the three essential factors of "incentive to invest. accumulation of surplus, and application of this surplus to the new inventions."<sup>31</sup> The most important organization is that for capital accumulation which serves as the surplus-creating instrument, although there is not expansion unless the elements of invention and investment are also present. This surplus-creating instrument need not be economic organization, but can be a religious organization such as the tribute collecting Sumerian priesthood in the Mesopotamian civilization, a political organization such as the Egyptian state which collected taxes, or a social organization such as slavery in the Classical Age. Quigley, of course, finds many sources of capital accumulation in any society, a result of society's complexity, but there is generally only one of significance.

Like all instruments, an instrument of expansion in the course of time becomes an institution and the rate of expansion slows down.

Though this process is much more effectual, it is the same as the institutionalization of any instrument, and appears specifically as a breakdown of one of the three necessary elements of production, usually in a decrease of the rate of investment. This decrease in the rate of investment occurs chiefly because the social group controlling the surplus ceases to apply it to new ways of doing things because they have a vested interest in the old way of doing things. Moreover, by a natural

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 132.

and unconscious self-indulgence, they begin to apply the surplus they control to non-productive but ego-satisfying purposes. When discussing the manners in which the vested interests prevent the fulfillment of human needs in a society, Quigley writes without the sobriety characteristic of most of his exposition. His scathing attacks on "the Establishment" in Tragedy and Hope made him the darling of John Birchers in America who saw him as "the Joseph Valachi of political conspiracy." And though he stated "I generally think that any conspiracy theory of history is nonsense" the vehemence with which he blames the for America's energy crisis the vehemence with which he blames the for dicates that he considers them a powerful opponent blocking progress in contemporary western society. This stage of conflict, while clearly the most important, is only one of the seven stages of evolution for a society.

This process of the institutionalization of an instrument of expansion allows the understanding of why civilizations rise and fall by permitting the division of the process into seven stages. These stages are Mixture, Gestation, Expansion, Age of Conflict, Universal Empire, Decay, and Invasion. Quigley's historiographical work on conceptualizing change in civilization is operationalized by examining a civilization through its correlation with this paradigm of seven stages.

Every society begins with the mixture of two or more cultures along their shared borders. But such casual cultural mixture is of little significance unless there comes into existance in the zone of mixture a new culture, arising from the mixture but different from the constituent parts. Also since cultural mixture occurs on the borders of

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<sup>32</sup>Gary Allen, None Dare Call It Conspiracy (Rossmoor, Ca: Concord Press, 1971), p. 22-3.

<sup>33&</sup>quot;The Professor Who Knew Too Much" <u>Potomac</u> magazine, <u>The Washington</u> Post, 23 March 1975, pp. 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Quigley, "America's Future in Energy," <u>Current History</u>,69 (July 1975): 1-5.

societies, civilizations rarely succeed one another, but undergo a displacement in space. But more importantly, this new society undergoes a displacement of culture that necessitates their making choices on how to fulfill their needs free from the acculturization process of their its original societies. The specific choices they make are unimportant so long as they are morphologically compatible to give rise to social custom and so long as enough members of the society subscribe to them. What is important is that if these choices can engender the necessary elements of an instrument of expansion in the formulative stage of gestation, that society can evolve into a civilization.

The next stage of a civilization is the exercise of its instrument of expansion through increased production of goods, increase in population of the society, increase in the geographic extent of the civilization, and in increase in knowledge, all of which comprise the Stage of Expansion. It is generally a period of vigorous change in political order and science. As the vigor promoting growth through the instrument of expansion in the society diffuses from the core area to the peripheral area of the society, the rate of expansion in the core area slows and it enters the Age of Conflict. This age is marked by growing tension of evolution and class conflicts, increasingly frequent and increasingly violent imperialist wars, and growing irrationality, pessimism, superstition, and other-worldliness. It is also marked by a shift from intensive expansion, that is by producing more goods with fewer resources but by better organization, to extensive expansion to satisfy increasing desires by using more resources with the same organization.

At this point the institution comes under attack by dissidents seeking reformation or circumvention to rejuvenate their instruments,

which has seldom worked. The clearest case to be found is the evolution of our Western civilization where both reform and circumvention have occurred. As a result, Western civilization has had three periods of expansion, the first about 970-1270, the second about 1420-1650, and the third about 1725-1929. The instrument of expansion in the first was feudalism, which became institutionalized into chivalry. This was circumvented by a new instrument of expansion Quigley calls "commercial capitalism." When this organization became institutionalized into mercantilism, it was reformed into industrial capitalism, which became the instance of expansion of the third age of expansion. By 1930 this organization had become institutionalized into monopoly capitalism, and the society was, for the third time, in a major era of crisis. 36

As long a Western society is able to invigorate one instrument of expansion through reform or circumvention, it can remain viable. However, Quigley is not optomistic on our prospects of reform because of the nature of revolution as essentially a collision between power and law, the law supporting the numerous vested interests on all levels. These are challenged when some event suddenly crystallizes previously dispersed and disorganized discontents into a structure of power determined to change observescent laws which are obstructing the satisfaction of needs. Success by the reformers depends on their ability to organize new organizational structures on all levels, structures which the population will recognize as instruments able to satisfy real needs, while "the success of the counter-revolutionary side depends on its success in persuading the people that their desires are true reflections of their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 348-414.

vested interests."

And Quigley finds the vested interests in contemporary society very strong. Thus, Quigley feets that:

"If Western Civilization reforms and again passes into Stage 3, it will be far too powerful to be defeated by Russian civilization; if Western Civilization does not reform, but continues through the Stage of Conflict into the Stage of Universal Empire, the threat from Russian civilization will be much greater." 38

This stage of Universal Empire is characterized by a single dominent political unit which stifles minor reforms of the other levels of society, thus making the society even less able to respond to the needs of its individuals. Even though this stage appears to be a period of relative peace and prosperity, it is illusionary and hides latent civil war and economic depression, which will reach fruition in the Stage of Decay. In the final stage, the Stage of Invasion, the civilization is no longer willing or able to defend itself and thus succumbs to outsiders from another younger civilization.

The seven stages thus presented are a convenient way of dividing a complex historical process, but this process is not relentlessly deterministic at all points but merely at some points, in the sense that men have power and free will but their actions have consequences nevertheless. Thus this historiography of morphological civilizations, which Quigley explores in many historical paradigms still places primary emphasis on cognition, a factor that above all others, man must understand.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>Quigley, "The Structure of Revolutions, With Applications to the French Revolution," pp. 14-15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Quigley, Evolution of <u>Civilizations</u>, p. 166.

The historical paradigms Quigley develops serve as the historian's cognitive system, much like any individual would use or misuse his general cognitive system; "Instead of dealing with life, we deal with our structuring of it." Once the structure of the cognitive system is understood, as Quigley understood it, the resulting objectives in methodology allows to remain cognitive in assessing any human experiences.

Quigley selt his historical metholology was applicable to other academic disciplines, which he attempted to do in a number of articles.

One of the more controversial was his article on "Assumption and Inference on Human Origins" in which he confranted anthropologists to reappraise their sacrosanct paradigms on human origins, including the Darwinian construct of evolution resulting from materialist struggle:

"The paradigms of the 19th century methods were analytical, isolating, quantitative, materialistic, objective, dualistic, etc. With these, great achievements were made, especially in the extension of factual knowledge and human powers. But this positivist, analytical method is now approaching marginal effectiveness, a condition in which relatively minor accretions of benefits will require gigantic allotments of resources."

What he calls for is a dissolution of the consensus on materialist evolutionism by default of sufficient evidence on other hypotheses and a reappraisal of the basic cognitive assumptions on which this hypothesis is based. Quigley contends that the idea that man without artifacts is not human or that human relationships must take place through artifacts is the kind of dehumanized point of view against which the 20th century is in growing revolt; "The care of one person for another, leading to what Montagu has the courage to call 'love', is not only a reality of human experience but undoubtably a significant

<sup>39</sup>Quigley, "Lecture to Inter-American Defense Council," (Washington, 1973), p. 6.

<sup>40</sup> Quigley, "Assumption and Inference," p. 536.

factor in human origins and human evolution."<sup>41</sup> Quigley's article was not intended as a general decrial of anthropology, as evidence in his remark that his professional work has rested primarily on an effort to apply anthropological methods to history. But he wished to compliment the holistic, comparative, and conceptualizing techniques prevelant in anthropology with the historian's perspective on the dimension of time and the processes of chronological change.<sup>42</sup>

A second such applied methodology article is "Our Ecological Crisis" in which he contends that "...the historical roots of our ecological crisis must be sought in the history of how our present attitudes towards nature and our fellow men came into existence."43 He begins the article with detailed definitions or degrees of "environmental pollution" as "the movement of objects by human action from places or conditions where they are natural or unobjectionable to places or conditions where they are unnatural, objectionable, and injurious."44 These detailed definitions exemplify Quigley's technique of extracting conceptual paradigms and then reenforcing or qualifying them with historical examples. After thus assessing and defining this contemporary phenomena, Quigley operationalizes it by asking "Why does our technology take such ecologically disruptive or destructive directions?"45 a question stated in such a way as to avoid common assumptions and inferences. He then conceptualizes on how he will seek the historical roots of the crisis by stating that primary concerns are:

<sup>41&</sup>quot;Falsification of a Source in Risorgimenta History." <u>Journal of Modern History</u> 20 (September 1948): 223-26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 536.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup>Quigley, "Our Ecological Crisis," <u>Current History</u> 59 (July 1970): 1.

<sup>44&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 4.

"...organizational questions, the patterns of behavior in our society which form it into a functioning social system, together with our technology on one side (determining what we can do) and our outlook and value system on the other side (determining what we will want to do).... Thus <u>Outlook</u> acts on <u>Organizations</u> which handle <u>Technology</u> against the <u>Natural Environment</u>...This means: 1) that the causes and the remedies of our ecological crisis must be sought in changes in outlook; and 2) that changes in our technology and even in our organizational arrangements are at best, concerned with systems rather than with causes."46

It would perhaps come as no surprise to readers acquainted with Quigley that his historical analysis of the roots of the ecological crisis finds fault in the separation of man from nature by culture, Greek dualism, and the secularization of future preference, and the remedy in medieval Christian pantheism translated into contemporary ecological holism. But still his argument is compelling perhaps as much because of its structural simplicity as for the force of its historical examples. Quigley also uses this approach successfully on such diverse issues as American foreign policy, energy, African decolonization, and contemporary youth dissent, as well as in Tragedy and Hope.

A third example of his application of methodology is in his few attempts at foretelling new observations. Although Quigley was uncomfortable with predicting the future, he took the opportunity when reviewing Victor Ferkiss's book on <a href="The Future of Technological">The Future of Technological</a>
Civilization, to foretell the benefits or detriments of American society to reform itself along the lines he and Ferkiss present. 47
Of much greater importance, however, is the work Quigley did as a consultant to the Department of Defense for many years on the development of weapons systems, much of which is currently unavailable. Quigley

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Quigley, "The Search for a Solution to the World Crisis, "The Futurist 9 (March 1975): 38-41.

recognized the military as an agent capable of effecting drastic change in society and thus must be made compatible with the goals and existing structure of that society. Because of the lengthy lead time in developing weaponry systems, Quigley had to project the optimum weapon system by assessing how past civilizations influenced their weapons systems, how future civilizations will resemble past civilizations, the sociological impacts of past weapons systems, and the technological capabilities of future systems. Such a study exemplified the dynamic interrelationships among all factors in a certain aspect of civilization. 48

Quigley clearly felt a proliferation of his cognitive insight into such diverse disciplines would bring about the change in outlook that could reform Western society. He felt our society has argely lost its basic distinction between necessary and important, in which material things were necessary but spiritual things important. It is difficult to reform our old methods of thinking no matter how bankrupt they may be because standing in the way of reform are the pressures exerted by institutionalized establishments, the profits of powerful groups producing equipment based on old ways of thinking, the specialized scholars protecting their topic, and the need of bureauacratized organizations for persons with the narrow technical training of the light organizations for persons with the narrow technical training of the light organizations. Because of this strong reaction, Quigley studied and sought to reform and strengthen the revolutionary tendencies of his students.

Yest Quigley taught the historical methods he felt were the first step towards reform of the old methods of thinking. He told his students that he was trying to train executives rather than clerks, the distinction

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>Quigley, "A Historical Projection of Tomorrow's World" prepared for the Sea-Based Deterrence Summer Study-Panel 1, 1964, pp. 1-23.

standing and knowledge. His forceful and wide-ranging lectures attacked the assumptions his students had perhaps never questioned. Quigley intended these disquieting lectures to provide the cultural shock which leads to cognitive sophistication, which:

"makes it possible to know both one's own cognitive system and that of any different group with which one works so that one may be able to translate both talk and action from one such system into the other, while recognizing the conventional and arbitrary nature of both." 50

Any executive cabable of using his vocabulary of talk and action with such cognitive sophistication is capable of understanding many things. While reflecting on the precarious position of our contemporary society coping with its third Age of Conflict, Quigley noted that "civilization is the race between education and catastrophe." Quigley, with his perceptive insight into our cognitive system, invaluably advanced the cause of education.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 420

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Quigley, "Needed: A Revolution in Thinking," p. 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>Untitled, unpublished article for <u>Georgetown Hoya</u>, p. 6.

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