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"Public Authority and the State in the Western Tradition:
A Thousand Years of Growth, A.D. 976 - 1976”

by Carroll Quigley Ph.D.




Part III: “The State of Individuals", A.D. 1776 - 1976

by Carroll Quigley Ph.D.





Thank you Dean Krogh.


Ladies and Gentlemen:


          This is the most difficult of the three lectures that I'm giving covering this thousand years of the growth of public authority.  What's happened in the last two hundred years is fairly clear to me; but it is not easy to convey it to you, even those of you who have had courses with me and are familiar with the framework of much of my thinking.  


          One reason for this difficulty, of course, is the complexity of the subject itself; but, after all, the preceding eight hundred years were quite complex as well as the last two hundred that we are going to deal with this evening.  A much more fundamental reason for the difficulty is this; and it is where we can have difficulties to-night:  The reality of the last two hundred years of the history of Western Civilization, including two hundred years of the history of our own country, is not reflected in the general brainwashing which you have received, in the political mythology which you have been hearing, or in the historiography of the period as it exists to-day. 


          The period from 1776 to 1976 I will divide into two parts.  The first, about a hundred and twenty, or twenty-five, years, i.e., to about 1890, which was a period of expansion of industrial society; and then the last eighty years, approximately, which is an age of profound crisis, not only in our own country, but in Western Civilization, which is the unit in which I carry on my thinking on the subject.


          In order to deal with this, I have to go back to fundamentals, and particularly to the fundamentals of human values; and, to do that, we must have paradigms.  The whole thousand years, as I explained in my first lecture, is a shift from a society made up of communities, in 976, to a society, to-day, where we have a state of monstrous power and atomized individuals.  


          I will use certain definitions: I am talking about society. And the society of Western Civilization a thousand years ago, which was made up of communities.  A society is an organization of persons and artifacts -- things made by people -- and it's an organization to satisfy human needs.  It would not exist if it had not come into existence to satisfy human needs.  Notice:  I do not say human desires.  One of the striking things about our society to-day is how remote our desires are from our needs.  If you ask anybody what they want, what they desire, they will give you lists of things which are as remote as can be from human needs.  Now, in this society, the process we have been tracing for the thousand years is the growth of the state.  And as I indicated in the first lecture, a state is not the same thing as a society, even though the Greeks and Romans thought so.  A state is an organization of power on a territorial basis.  The link between the two, a society (whether it's made up of communities or of individuals) and a state, is this:  Power rests in the ability to satisfy human needs. 


          Now, I put on the board something which former students are familiar with.  I always call it the levels of culture, the aspects of a society: military, political, economic,  social, emotional, religious, intellectual.  Those are your basic human needs.  The interesting thing about them is that they are arranged in evolutionary sequence.  Millions of years ago, before men were even human, they had need for defense of the group, because it is perfectly obvious that men cannot live outside of groups.  They can only satisfy any needs, or almost any needs, by cooperating within a group.  But I'll go further than that, and return to it again in a moment, that men will not become men unless they grow up in communities.  We will come back to that because it is the basis of what I am going to talk about to-night. 


          If you have a group, it must be defended against outsiders.  That's military.  Before men came out of the trees they had that. 


          If you are going to obtain your needs being satisfied in some kind of a group, you must have ways of settling disputes and arguments and reconciling individual problems within the group.  That's political. 


          You must have organizational patterns for satisfying material needs: food, clothing, and shelter.  [That's economic.]


          And then come two which have been largely destroyed in the last thousand years of Western Civilization, i.e., men have social needs.  They have needs for other people; they have need to love and to be loved.  They have need to be noticed.  Sirhan Sirhan killed Robert Kennedy because nobody had ever noticed him; and, by God, he was determined that, from now on, he, someone would know that he existed.  In fact, most of these "motive," "motiveless" assassinations are of this type.  Someone went up to the top of the University of Texas tower with a high-powered rifle and shot something like seventeen people before they got him.  This was because no one had ever noticed him.  Men need other people.  That's the social need.  The basis of social inter-relationships is reciprocity: if you cooperate with others, others will cooperate with you. 


          The next is emotional needs.  Men must have emotional experience.  It's obtained in two ways, that I can see:  moment-to-moment relationships with other people, moment-to-moment, and moment-to-moment relationships with nature.  Our society to-day has so cluttered up our lives with artifacts -- TV sets,  or whatever it is, automobiles -- and organizational structures, that to have moment-to-moment relationships with nature is almost impossible.  Most people don't have any idea what the weather is out[side].  Someone said recently that until September we had a great draught here.  And four or five people standing there said "That's ridiculous."   We had a shortage, I believe, of about almost eight inches of rain up to the middle of September of this year in Washington.  Nobody notices it.  Because they are in buildings, it doesn't matter to them if it's raining or not.


          Religious needs.  It became fashionable in Western Civilization, particularly in the last hundred years, to be scornful of religion.  But it is a fact that human beings have religious needs.  They have a need for a feeling of certitude in their minds about things that they cannot control and that they do not fully understand, and, with humility, they will admit they do not understand.  What happens, when you destroy people's religious expression, is that they establish secularized religions, for instance, Marxism. 


          Now, on the intellectual level.  People have intellectual needs.  I used to say to students that Marilyn Monroe had profound intellectual needs.  And when nobody else would treat her as an intellect or even a potential intellect, for obvious reasons, she was starved for intellectual experience.  That's why she married a man like Arthur Miller: because she thought he was an intellectual.  All right, those are the human needs.  


          Power is the ability to satisfy those needs.  And for someone to say that power is organized force, or that power is the outcome of an election, or that power is the ability to cut off our supply of oil, it is a completely inadequate way of looking at it.  Because my experience and study of the destruction of civilizations and the collapse of great empires has now convinced me that empires and civilizations do not collapse because of deficiencies on the military or the political levels.  The Roman army never met an army that was better than it was.  Any time.  But the Roman army could not be sustained when all of these things had collapsed and nobody cared.  Nobody wanted to serve, nobody wanted to pay taxes, nobody cared.


          All right.  The other part of this, this is going to require that you put these things together to some extent.  Persons, personalities, if you wish, can be made only in communities.  Communities are intimate relationships between a, diverse types of individuals -- a kinship group, or a local group, a neighborhood, a village, a large family, possibly, whatever it is.  Without communities, no infant will be sufficiently socialized.  He may grow up and be forty years old, he may have made an extremely good living, he may have engendered half a dozen children, but he is still an infant unless he was properly socialized and that occurs in the first four or five years of life.  We have attempted in our society to-day to throw the whole burden of socializing our population upon the school system, to which the individual arrives only at the age of four or five.  A state of individuals, such as we have now reached in Western Civilization, will not create persons; and the atomized individuals who make it up will be motivated by desires, which do not necessarily reflect needs.  Instead of the need for other people, they need a shot of heroin; instead of some kind of religious conviction, they have to be with the winning team.  In fact, when you come to a civilization as it turns off the last couple of centuries, and ours still has a couple of centuries to go, I would guess.  Things are moving faster than they ever did in any civilization I ever knew before this one.  But we still probably have at least a century or two centuries to go.


          Now, human needs are the basis of power.  The state, I said, is a power structure on a territorial basis; and the state will survive only if it has sufficient ability to satisfy enough of these needs.  It is not enough that it has organized force  And when a politician says, "Elect me President and I will establish law and order," and by law and order he means organized force or even organized power of other kinds (and I won't analyze that.  it's too complex.  We don't have time).  I will simply say that the object of the political level is to legitimize power:  that is, to get people, in their minds, to recognize and accept what is the actual power relationship in their society.


          Next Tuesday a decision will be made as to who shall be President of the United States.  That will not reflect necessarily the actual power relationships of the United States at all.  If the people are so frustrated with intellectual frustration.  Many of you come to these lectures because you have been intellectually frustrated, and you want to be exposed again to my insistent demands that you think about things.  For example, we no longer have intellectually satisfying arrangements in our educational system, in our arts, humanities, or anything else; instead we have slogans, ideologies.  An ideology is a religious or emotional expression.  So when a society is reaching its end, in the last couple of centuries, you have what I call misplacement of satisfactions.  You find your emotional satisfaction in making a lot of money, or being elected in 1972 to the White House, or something of this kind.  Or proving to the poor, half-naked people of Southeast Asia that you can kill them in large numbers.  And out of this you get the satisfactions which are being frustrated up here.


          Now, the state is a good state if it is sovereign and if it is responsible.  The idea that the state has to be any of these other things, such as, for example, democratic, is more or less incidental.  If democracy reflects the structure of society's power, then the state has to be democratic.  But if the reflection of power, and the pattern of power, in a society is not a democratic pattern, then you cannot have a democratic state.  This is what happens in Latin America, and Africa, and places like this, where they have an election and the army doesn't like who's elected, so they move in and kick him out and put somebody else in.  That's because the election did not reflect the power situation, in which the dominant thing is organized force.  So when I say governments have to be responsible, I'm saying the same thing as I said when I said that they have to be legitimate, i.e., that they have to reflect the power structure of the society.  Politics is the area for establishing responsibility by legitimizing power, i.e., somehow demonstrating to people that the power structure is this.  And it may take a revolution, such as the French Revolution, or it may take a war, like the American Civil War.  In the American Civil War in 19, 1861 the structure of power in the United States was such -- perhaps unfortunately,  I don't know -- that the South could not leave unless the North was willing.  It was that simple.  But it took a war to prove it. 


          Now, sovereignty I defined last time; and I want to run through it for the benefit of those who weren't here.  Sovereignty has eight aspects:  DEFENSE; JUDICIAL, [i.e.,] settling disputes; ADMINISTRATIVE POWER, [i.e.,] discretionary actions for the public need; TAXATION, [i.e.,] mobilizing resources, this is what the French government didn't have in 1776, one of them; LEGISLATION, [i.e.,] the finding of rules and [the] establishment of rules through promulgation and statute; the sixth, EXECUTIVE, i.e., the enforcement of laws and judicial decisions.  Then two which are absolutely of paramount importance to-day: MONETARY, [i.e.,] the creation and control of money and credit -- if that is not an aspect of the public sovereignty, then the state is to-day far less than fully sovereign; and the eighth one, the last, THE INCORPORATING POWER, i.e., the right to say that an association of people is a fictitious person with the right to hold property and sue, and be sued, in the courts.  Notice:  the federal government of the United States to-day does not have the seventh and eighth, but I'll come back to that later. 


          In the meantime, I'm still on my introduction for this evening, and I want to speak of what happened in the last thousand years.  If we go back before 976, when you had communities, little villages, really, in Europe, the main core of people's life and experience, which controlled their behavior and determined their desires -- controls and rewards, I call it -- was in this, the religious and emotional and social [levels].  In these three.  They had religious beliefs, they had emotional relationships with the people whom they saw every day, they had social relationships as well with them.  That was the core of it.  The significant thing is this:  that those controls and those rewards are internalized; they are inside.  They are what was acquired very largely in the first four or five years of life.  When we speak of the need for socializing infants.  When a child is born, he is not a person[ality]; he is a human being.  That is a totally different thing.  He is utterly potential.  When somebody becomes a personality, such as you or myself, then he has traits which were acquired out of his potentialities as the result of experiences over numerous years. 


          Now, here you have internalized controls.  That's why they could get along in 976 without a state: because all significant controls were internalized on these bases.  The reason I took the year 976 was that, although Western Civilization had come into existence about two hundred years before that, let's say, 876 or even earlier, it began to expand in 976.  By expand I mean they began to produce more goods per person, per day or per year, whatever you want.  And you know what I mean by expansion if you took my freshman course:  increased output per capita, increased knowledge, increased geographic area for the civilization itself, and increased population.  In 976 that began.  And we'll put an arrow here indicating that.  The chief way in which that economic expansion was achieved was by specialization and exchange:  that instead of each little group's trying to produce everything which would satisfy all of these needs, little groups began to concentrate and say we will produce only wool and exchange wool for other things.  And so forth and so forth.  That process of increasing specialization and exchange, which is the basis of expansion in any civilization, I'll call commercialization.  And as long as the society is expanding, that process of commercialization will continue, as it has for a thousand years in our society, so that to-day in our society everything is commercialized, politics, religion, education, ideology, belief, everything, the armed services.  Everything, practically, is commercialized.  Everything has its price. 


          All right, when this expansion reaches a crisis, you get increasing politicalization.  That is, instead of... I won't go into the details of this.  It can be explained in detail, as most of you, perhaps, know.  Politicalization is that the expansion is slowing up, and you are no longer attempting to achieve increased output per capita, or whatever it is, or increased wealth, or increased satisfactions, or whatever is motivating you, by expansion;  but you are going to do it by mobilizing power.  We have seen this going on in our society now for almost a century.  Increased politicalization of the society.


          And then, as the society continues and does not reform, you get increased militarization of the society.  You can see that certainly in Western Civilization, and in the history of the United States.  In the last forty years, our society has been drastically militarized.  It certainly isn't yet as militarized as other societies and other periods have been.  We have a long way to go in this direction still. 


          Now, as this process goes on, you get certain other things.  I've hinted at a number of them.  Misplacement of satisfactions.  You find your satisfactions -- your emotional satisfaction, your social satisfaction -- not on moment-to-moment relationships with other people and with nature, but with power, or with wealth, or even with organized force -- sadism, in some cases.  Go out and murder a lot of people, in a war -- a just war, naturally. 


          The second thing that I'd like to point to [in] the period as this goes on: increasing remoteness of desires from needs.  I've mentioned this.  Then the next thing is an increasing confusion between means and ends.  The ends are the human needs, but if I asked most people what are the needs of these, they could hardly tell me.  Instead they would want the means that they have been brainwashed or accepted, that will give them the satisfaction that they think of a need.  But it's perfectly obvious that the methods we have been using are not working.  Never was any society in human history as rich and as powerful as the United, as Western Civilization and the United States, and it is not a happy society.  I just looked at a book this week called The Joyless Economy, by an economist [named Tibor Scitovsky], in which he diagrammed some of these things. 


          All of that is establishment of new paradigms.


          Now, what happened in the last two hundred years?  In 1776, Europe was approaching, and Western Civilization was approaching, a revolutionary situation.  Why?  A revolutionary situation is one in which the structure of power -- real power -- is not reflected in the structure of law, institutions, and conventional arrangements.  Law and legal arrangements, including constitutional arrangements, were not legitimate in 1776 in much of Western Civilization, i.e., they were not responsible because they did not reflect power.  The laws of the polity, whether it is the English Parliament, which legally had the right to rule America; or with what is the nightmare constitution of France, which no longer in any way reflected the structure of power in French society; or whether, east of the Rhine, it was the enlightened despotisms which existed there, which did not reflect the power struggle, the structure of Europe at all, as Napoleon showed them very quickly.  This, therefore, is a revolutionary situation. 


          Let's look a little more closely at these. 


          In England, the polity established control of the country in an oligarchy of landowners, the Whig oligarchy.  Members of Parliament were sent to Parliament by pieces of land, and someone, who owned a piece of land which did have the right to send a member to Parliament, could send a member to Parliament, whether that piece of land had anyone living on it or not.  Well, that was not a reflection of the power structure of England.  That pieces of land were powerful.  And I would, do not have to demonstrate to you that the legal arrangements by which the British Parliament made the rules to govern life in the United States was [sic] equally unrealistic. 


          I'll leave France for a moment and go east of the Rhine.  In Central Europe we had what was called Enlightened Despotism:  small principalities ruled by despots who presumably in law had the right to say,  "This will happen.  That will happen.  Something else will happen, the show is over ."


          What they tried to do in the period from 1776 onward, for about twenty-five years, was to establish some kind of a more rational life in their principalities, to create a uniform system of weights and measures.  They couldn't do it.  Their systems of weights and measures -- I won't attempt to describe them to you -- were absolute, unholy chaos.  They had a different weight or measurement for every commodity.  Those measurements changed as you went from village to village or district to district.  And they also had been changing in time for hundreds of years.  What had been happening is the measurements had been getting larger because the power of the creditors was so great that, if you owned, owed a bushel of wheat to your landlord, all the landlords together, over generations, could make the bushel a larger measure. 


          All right, let's continue.  In Eastern Europe, I discussed it adequately the last time.  I'll simply point out that, in this period, Poland disappeared.  It disappeared because the landlord class in Poland preferred keeping their serfs down, as their slaves, to independence.  And were unwilling to organize a modern army, with modern weapons and modern military training, to defend Poland against outside enemies, such as Prussia, Russia or Austria.  For that reason, those three got together and divided up Poland in 1795, so Poland did not exist.  And did not exist again, you know -- briefly under Napoleon there was a Grand Duchy of Warsaw -- but it did not exist again until 1919. 


          In France, and I described this last week, in 1776 the polity had reached a condition of total paralysis.  They did not have sovereignty.  The government did not have the taxing power; it did not have the legislative power; it did not have the incorporating power; it did not have the judicial power.  It did not have most of these eight aspects of sovereignty which I mentioned to you.  And in 1776 they discovered that, when the government tried to abolish the guilds and could not do so, because under the law they could not abolish them unless it agreed to pay off their debts.  And it could not pay off their debts because the government didn't have the taxing power.  And didn't have the taxing power because it didn't have the judicial power:  if it took someone to court, the judges would say, "No, you have no right to examine his income.  You can ask him only what he has been paying for the last couple of hundred years on that piece of property," or whatever it is.


          The result was the explosion of the French Revolution, in which you got not only about the most sovereign state in Europe, by the time of Napoleon, let's say 1805.  And notice:  Napoleon was an enlightened despot, the last one in Europe.  Anyone who says, as, for instance, Robert Palmer says, that in 1789 France was leading the parade in terms of government and public authority, just doesn't know what he's talking about.  France was bringing up the absolute rear in 1789 as far as public authority and sovereignty is [sic] concerned.  And that is why, say, France got their enlightened despot so late.  He wasn't even a Frenchman; he was an Italian.  But what he did was he imposed an Italian government on France.  Provided it was so rational, so powerful, so well-organized, and the fact that the new sovereignty was embodied in the nation, a new entity, really, gave it a power which made it possible for him almost to conquer all of Europe.  Although he was ultimately defeated, as most conquerors of all of Europe have been throughout history.  And we have William II in 1918, Hitler in 1945.  There were others:  Philip II in the Sixteenth Century, I don't know, England, perhaps, in the early Fifteenth Century, and so forth. 


          By 1820, after the Napoleonic system has been replaced, all four of these areas which I have mentioned were unstable, but they were much more stable and much more legitimate than they had been in 1776.  Now, although I say that in 1820 they were fundamentally not that stable, we know that there was political stability in Europe after 1820 for at least three generations, to at least the 1860's.  A brief war in '66, and then so forth.  I won't go into that.  But the stability of Europe from 1815 to about 1880, or '85, is now something we look back on with nostalgia.  The reasons for this were, had nothing to do with the structure of the state, except to the degree that the structure of the state had become sufficiently rationalized and sufficiently sovereign through the period of revolution, from 1776 to, let's say, 1820.  Sufficiently stable.  So that with the additional events, it looked like stability.  Now, the additional events were a new Age of Expansion. 


          The Agricultural Revolution of about 1720 and onward, where more and more food was being obtained from land with less and less labour, and so forth.  And above all, the Industrial Revolution:  the patenting of the steam engine in 1776.  You see 1776 is a very significant year.   It is not just Bicentennial Year. The Wealth of Nations, which advocated free trade, was 1776; Watt's patenting of the steam engine is 1776; the failure of the French to reorganize their political system is clearly 1776, and so forth.


          Now, in the Nineteenth Century, expansion, which is the third time in Western Civilization in which we had expansion, people fell back from conflict and politicalization and militarization to the level of commercialization, and industrialization, if you want to add it.  But this process means that certain subversive influences were being accelerated.  One is:  externalization of rewards and controls.  The disruption of communities, the destruction of religion, the frustration of emotions, all of these were greatly intensified by the Industrial Revolution:  railroads, factories, growth of cities, technological revolution in the countryside and in the manner, growing of food, and so forth.  The externalization of rewards and controls to the point that we are at to-day.  A continued acceleration of the main focus of the activities of the society downward.   Again, i.e., from these areas of internal controls down to these areas of external controls.  If you can be controlled by being bought, like a higher salary, to go to San Diego, or something, and give up all your friends and associations, now that's an external control.  If you can be forced to go there by power, if you can be sent there by the draft, or something, all right, that's militarization. 


          Another thing which became very obvious in the Nineteenth Century is increasing role of propaganda to change people's ways of looking at things.  Right at the beginning of the lecture, I offended some of you by saying you have been brainwashed.  That is not an insult.  It's a simple statement of fact.  When any infant is born and is socialized in a society, even if he is socialized to become a very mature individual, he has been brainwashed.  That is, he has been given a structure for categorizing his experience and a system of values applied to that structuring of categories.  But this has now become, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries in our society, a propagandist system, in which increasing emphasis is put on the future.  Think only of the future. This is what the rebellions of the '50's and '60's were against.  Future preference:  plan; study hard; save.  All of these things which I used to get from my maiden aunts:  "Wise bees save honey; wise boys save money."  And then they'd each secretly give me a dollar as I was leaving.  "A penny saved is a penny earned."   "A stitch in time....."  All, everything that's in "Poor Richard's."  The Benjamin Franklin propaganda machine.


          Another change in the Nineteenth Century in this propaganda system is the increasing emphasis upon material desires.  If you had the material things you want -- a nice house in the suburbs, a swimming pool, a couple of big cars, a place in the country, a motor boat, a trailer to take it back and forth.  And what do you want?  Anything else?  Material things.  Now, a pocket computer, citizens' band.  It's endless.  Material desires.


          A third thing we were brainwashed: that the only thing that matters is individualism. They called it freedom. There is no such thing as freedom.  There is a thing called liberty.  It's quite different, actually.  I'll not spend much time on this.  If you're interested, read Ruggiero's History of European Liberalism, particularly the, couple of first chapters.  Oxford University Press, 1927.   That's the English translation of an Italian book.  Freedom is freedom from restraints.  We're always under restraints.  The difference between a stable society and an unstable one is the restraints are external in an unstable one.  In a stable society we don't even need a government.  Ultimately the restraints on your actions are internal.  They're self-disciplined.  They are the restraints that you have accepted because it is the way in which you can satisfy all of your desires and needs to the degree that's good for you. 


          And then another thing which they have brainwashed us in the last hundred years:  that quantitative change is superior to any qualitative attributes.  In other words, if we can turn out more automobiles this year than last year, it doesn't matter whether they're half as good.  And the same is true of everything.  We are quantifying every[thing], and this is why we are trying to put everything now on computers.  Governments no longer have to make decisions; the computers will do it. 


          Another thing they've tried to do, and have succeeded, is to give us vicarious satisfactions for many of these frustrations.  It is unbelievable the way American people are hung up on vicarious experiences: I can.... TV, movies, mass spectator sports.  You have no idea what small towns and cities of America is [sic] like, Friday night like this, when the local high school football or basketball team is engaged in competition with their neighbor eighteen miles away.  And what a gloomy place the chapel or church is to-morrow morning, I mean Sunday morning, if they lose -- it won't matter if it rains.  People need exercise; they do not need to watch other people exercise, particularly people who've already had too much exercise.  Vicarious satisfaction.  These sexy magazines.  This is vicarious sex.  If anyone rushes up to buy one, I'd like to say to him "The real thing is better." 


          The replacement, this is part of what brainwashing has gone on for the last 100 years, the replacement of intellect, intelligence, intellectual and of religion by ideologies and science.  It is hardly possible to-day to discuss in any sensible way the problems of the historical past without running up against Marxist interpretations.  I have nothing against Marx['s theories], except the fact they do not explain what happened, which, to me, is a fatal defect.  The very idea that between science and religion there is some kind of a conflict, when science is a method for investigating experience, and religion is something quite different.  Religion is the fundamental, necessary internalization of your value system of more permanent values. 


          Another thing that they've tried to get upon us in the last 100 years -- and it is now dying in front of us -- is the myth of the nation, as the repository of sovereignty, can be both a state and a community.  This is the great French revolution thing, you see.  Why is it that the nation....?  It can be the repository of sovereignty.  But suppose weapons systems in a society are of such a character that it is possible for a government with the existing weapon system to impose its will over an area a thousand miles across.  And suppose in that thousand mile area there are a number of nations, like the Bretons, the Catalonians, the Welsh, the Lithuanians.  These are as much nations as the ones that somehow or other became the embodiments of sovereignty in the Nineteenth Century.  Why did the English, the French, the Castilians, the Hohenzollerns, and others became [sic] the repository of sovereignty in nations: (Notice: they missed out in the whole Balkan and Danube basin.)  They did because, at that time, weapons systems made it possible to compel obedience over areas which were approximately the same size as these national groups that I have mentioned.  And as a result, they were able to crush out other nationalisms, such as the Scots, the Irish, the Welsh, the Catalonians -- who had a much longer and much more cultured history than the Castilians -- the Provençals, and many others.  In other words, nationalism is an episode in history, and it fitted a certain power struggle and a certain configuration of human life in our civilization which would allow these groups.  Now what's happening?  They all want autonomy.  The Scots think that they can get their independence and control the oil that's being found in the North Sea, and then England will become a colonial area for Edinburgh. And so forth. 


          In 1820, thus, the state was essentially unstable.  It was not fully sovereign.  For example, it did not have the control of credit and money, in most places.  It did not have the control of corporations, in most places.  It is not stable because the nation was not a satisfactory community.  The very idea that, because everyone who speaks French is in the same nation and, therefore -- in the Nineteenth Century -- in the same state (what the French republicans want) they, therefore, is [sic] in the same community as you, is just not true. 


          And to attempt to socialize people leaving out the first four or five years of life, and ignoring what happens in that period.  We're doing the same thing in this country in regard to the Blacks and the Latin Americans and many others.  They're now saying "Oh, yes, we'll have..., we'll push back..., we'll take them from the homes at age 2."  A few years ago they had a big program: take them for a few hours at age two and three and four, but this will not socialize them.  The first two years are important.  The way a child is treated in the first two days is of vital importance.  He has to be loved.  The.... Above all. he has to be talked to.  And so forth.


          The nation or the state, as we now have it in terms of the structure of power, cannot be a community. 


          Another thing which may, points out the instability of this system, the power system of the state, you know:  the individual cannot be made the basic unit of society, what we have tried to do, or of the state, since the internalization of controls must be the preponderant influence in any stable society.  Even in a society where it looks as if all power is in the hands of the government -- let's say, Soviet Russia -- still eighty percent, at least, of human behavior in Russia is controlled by internalized controls which were socialized in them by the way they were treated from the moment that they were born.  And as a result, they have come to accept certain things which allow the Russian state to act as if it can do anything, when it obviously can't.  It knows it can't.  Notice the new Russian budget announced this week:  as a result of our pouring of our food surpluses into Russia, they are now going to raise the consumption sector of their new budget.


          The shift of weapons in our society.  This is a profound problem.  I've spent ten years working on this, through all of history, and I hope to produce a book on it eventually if I can find a publisher.  (I have a publisher, but I don't want go back to him.  He lied to me too many times.)  The shift of weapons in any civilization and, above all, in our civilization, from shock weapons to missile weapons.  Notice, that if you go back several hundred years to the Middle Ages, all weapons were shock, i.e., you came at the guy with a spear or a sword.  And even as late as 1916, in the First World War, you came at the Germans with bayonets, after a preliminary barrage with artillery.  But we have now shifted completely, almost totally, to missile weapons.  Missile weapons which you hurl.  You may shoot, you may have bombs dropped from airplanes, take a hand grenade, and, whatever it is.  Missile weapons.  This has an absolutely dominant influence upon the ability to control individuals.  And individuals cannot be controlled by missile weapons.  The chief reason for that, and again I hope when the book comes, if you read the rest you can look it up.  There'll be endless analyses of Chinese history, Byzantine history and Russian history and everything else, and the book is about nine-tenths written, I'd say, in the last ten years.


          The difference between a shock weapon and a missile weapon is essentially this:  a missile weapon is either fired or it isn't fired.  It cannot be half-way fired.  In other words, once you let it go, it's out of your control.  It's gone.  It is a killing weapon.  But a shock weapon -- a billy club or a bayonet -- can be used to any degree that you wish.  And if you say to someone who's sitting in a chair, "Get up and out of the room," and you pull out a machine gun, or you call in a B-52 bomber that, or you pull the pin in a hand grenade, and say "I'll...."  But with a bayonet..... 


          All right.  Individual behavior in our society no longer can be controlled by any system of weaponry that we are using.  In fact, without eighty percent of [our population's having] internalized controls, we do not have enough people, even if we equip them with shock weapons, to control the behavior of the population which does not have internalized controls.  We're already reached that in our society.


          One reason, of course, is that the twenty percent that don't have internalized controls are concentrated into certain areas.  I won't go into the whole business of this, of controls.  It opens up the whole field of guerrilla resistance, terrorism, and everything else.  These cannot be controlled by any system of organized structure of force which exists, at least on a basis of missile weaponry.  And, as I say, it would take too many people on the basis [of shock weaponry].  We have now done what the Romans did when they started committing suicide: we have shifted from an army of citizen soldiers to an army of mercenaries, and those mercenaries are being recruited, in our society, as they were in Roman society, from the twenty percent of their population which does not have the internalized controls of classical civilization. 


          All right.  Now.  The appearance of stability from 1840 to about 1900 was superficial, temporary and destructive in the long run, because, I have said, you must have communities; and communities and societies must rest upon cooperation and cannot be on competition.  Any society who says that you can run the society on the basis of here's everyone's trying to maximize his own greed is talking total nonsense.  And all the study of human society shows that it's nonsense.  And to teach it in schools, and to go on TV and call it the “American way of life,” still doesn't make it true.  Competition and envy cannot become the basis of any society or any community.


          Now, the ecological, the economic and technological achievements of industrialization, here, were fundamentally mistaken.  This could get quite technical; I'll try not to.  The expansion, the economic expansion of industrialization has been based on plundering the natural capital of the globe, such as it was created over millions of years:  the plundering of the soils of their fertility; the plundering of the human communities, whether they were our own or somebody else's, in Africa or anywhere else; the plundering of the forest.  In 1776 the wealth of forest in North America was beyond belief; within 200 years, in fact 150 years, it has been destroyed or more than ninety percent of it wasted.  And it had in it three hundred years of accumulated capital saving and investment of sunlight and the fertility of the soil.  (And now that our bread is going to have five times as much fiber by making it out of sawdust, we're going to go on plundering the forests to a larger degree, which, of course, is one of the reasons I am sure that President Ford two days ago signed the new bill which allowed clear cutting in the National Forests.  Because we need that roughage or fiber in our bread, having taken all the natural fiber out of the wheat, of course, and thrown it away.) 


          The energy which gave us the Industrial Revolution -- coal, oil, natural gas -- represented the accumulated saving of twel..., three weeks of sunlight that managed somehow to be saved in the earth out of the three billion years of sunshine.  Because that's what the fossil fuels are.  This is not income to be spent; this is capital to be saved and invested.   And we have now destroyed into what we call entropy -- i.e., into a form of energy which is no longer possible to be utilized.  We have now destroyed into entropy eleven or twelve days of that accumulated twenty-one days of sunlight.


          And we have wasted it. 


          For example, we have changed our agricultural system, which used to be a system in which seed was put into the earth to take sunlight, rain and the wealth of the soil to create food, and we have replaced it with an agricultural system which is entirely capital intensive, has eliminated labor, has eliminated land to a very considerable extent, so that we pour out what we call food.  It's now chemical synthetic.  And we have done that by putting into a smaller and smaller amount of soil a larger and larger amount of chemicals made out of fossil fuels.  Just to give you one figure:  every bushel of corn sent to the Russians represents one gallon of gasoline.  And they say that we are getting by selling our grain to the Russians, we're getting the foreign exchange that will allow us to pay for the petroleum, at fourteen dollars a barrel, that we're bringing in.  Nobody ever stops to look at how many gallons of ... did you get to send this to the Russians.  To sell millions of bushels which represent millions of gallons.


          From 1940 to 1970,  and I put this in to indicate to you how our whole system is destroying communities.  Much of the legislation of the last forty years in this country has been aimed at the destruction of families, neighborhoods, ghettoes, parishes, or anything else.  In thirty years, from 1940 to 1970, three million American farms were abandoned because the people who worked on them with their families could not compete with the corporation farmers using the new chemical methods of producing crops.  Thirty million people left these abandoned farms and the rural areas and went into the towns and into the cities.  Millions of them, millions of them certainly, to be, get on relief.  In 1970, the last year for which I have any reliable figures, two thousand farms a week are going out of production.  


        These are the farms on which we brought up your grandparents, the people who won the Civil War, indeed, the people who fought in the First [World] War, and, in many cases, even in the Second War.  Will the tractors be able to fight the next war?   When there are no more farm boys to fight.  Well, of course, whether there are farm boys or not, they won't want to fight.  Eight hundred thousand rural people each year, in 1970, were leaving rural areas and moving into towns and being replaced by corporations.  


        In the same way, by urban renewal and other things, in the cities we are destroying communities.


          The fundamental cause of world instability to-day, and it's all pervasive, is the destruction of communities by commercialization of all human relationships with resulting neuroses and psychoses.  The technological increase, and speeding up, of transportation, communication, and weapons systems is creating power areas to-day wider than existing political structures.  We still have half a dozen at least political structures in Europe, but the power system of our technology and  Western Civilization to-day, as it exists, is such that most of Europe should be a single power system.  Therefore this is instability. 


          Medical science and the population explosion have continued to produce people and people, when the supply of food and the supply of jobs are increasingly precarious, not just in the United States, but everywhere, because the whole purpose of using fossil fuels in the corporate structure is to eliminate jobs.   "Labor saving," we call it.  As if there were something wrong with working.  Working is one of the joys of life.  And if we are creating a society in which working is a pain in the neck, then we have created a society which is not fit for human beings.  It will be obvious to you that I have enjoyed my work, and enjoyed it here, although at the end of my career I have no conviction that I did any good.  Fortunately, I had a marvelous parent, and a marvelous mother [Mary Frances Carroll, 1878 - 1957, wife of William Francis Quigley, 1880 - 1957] and we were taught you don't have to win, but you have to give it all you've got.  Then it won't matter.


          Now,  to get back to the structure of the state and sovereignty.  We now have a society in America, but [too] in Europe and in much of the rest of the world, which is totally dominated by the two elements of sovereignty which were not included in the state structure: control of banking and credit and the corporation.  These are free of political controls.  They have now largely monopolized power in Western Civilization and in our society without social responsibility.  And are ruthlessly going forward to eliminate land, labor, entrepreneurial / managerial skills, and everything else which the economists once told us were the chief elements of production.  And the only element of production that they are concerned with is the one they can control:  capital.  So everything now is capital intensive, including medicine.  


          And it hasn't worked.  I'll just give you one figure.  Nobody has a more capital intensive medical system than that of the United States, and many of you may be well satisfied with it.  I simply want to point out a couple of facts.  When a boy baby is born in the United States, his expectation of life is less than that in nineteen other countries in the world.  And it's that good only because, while our infant mortality rate is not good, it is better than our adult mortality rate.  In other words, in infant mortality we are not the best.  We are about ninth or tenth.  These figures are about 1972, I think.  Let us look at a man, a boy, ten year old in the United States to-day.  His expectation of life is less than that of thirty other countries, according to the United Nations statistics.  I would say more [here] than anybody in those thirty countries are paying for a capital intensive medical system devoted to keeping people, who are almost dead, alive a few more days, instead of making people grow up healthy, by teaching them that work is fun, by teaching them that they don't have to be gluttons.  That with moderation -- I mean, we all.... In the United States, more than half of our food is wasted.  And that may be because it isn't that good.  Exercise, moderation, and so forth -- it's all the old stuff we used to get in Sunday school.  It just happens to be correct. 


          Now, I come to a topic of delicacy:  the US constitutional crisis.  The three branches of government [system] set up in 1789 does not contain the eight aspects of sovereignty.  It left out completely, for example, the administrative power.  The result is that ever since the three branches of government have been struggling to decide which of them will control the administrative power.  The growth of political parties was necessary to establish relationships between the three branches.  Changes in the process of the nomination for election.  I used to tell my students it doesn't matter who votes in an election; the important thing is the nomination.  And, when you come to the election, it doesn't matter who votes.  What's important is who didn't vote.  Every election in the United States, and increasingly so, is determined by the people who didn't vote.  And they're turned off for various reasons. 


          As a result of the three branches that were set up, they're out, they've all tried to go outside the sphere in which they should be restrained.


          Walking over here with the Dean and Professor Brown, we spoke briefly about the Latin School that I went to.  The oldest school in the United States.  1635.  Preparatory school.  Harvard was created the next year as a place for Latin School boys to go to.  And in my day, it was the largest single source of supply.  My day would be 1929 - 1930.  It was the largest single source of supply.  Although Harvard was doing everything they could to cut down on them, the Latin School boys.  But the chief method that they tried to cut us down was by raising the requirements for us, and we could handle that.  But to-day that school is controlled by a judge in Boston who has taken it upon himself to tell the school who will be admitted.  And he has said:  you must have so many girls; you must have such a percentage of blacks; and so forth and so forth and so forth.   And if they do not meet....   And you cannot have entrance exams; and, if people fail, you can't throw them out.  And what was once an absolutely incredible preparatory school [is now being destroyed].  It had many drawbacks -- it was murderous.  But if it gets any students into any competitive system of entrance in the country, in numbers of the university in question is wrong.


          Now, one of the flaws in our, to me the most ominous one, in our Constitutional set-up.  The fact that the Federal Government does not have control of money and credit; it does not have control over corporations.  It is therefore not really sovereign.  And it is not really responsible.  Because it is now controlled exactly by those two groups:  those who control the flows of the money and corporations.  The new public financing of the Presidency is arranged so they can spend as much as they want, voluntary contributions, to elect someone that he has not authorized, is legal.


          The President of the United States, when I look at him, as he exists, is what young Schlesinger -- that's Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. -- called the Imperial Presidency.  What I see is Caesar Augustus.  He is commander-in-chief, that's what imperator, emperor, means.  He's the head of the executive branch.  He's the head of the state as well as head of the executive branch and these other things.  Head of the state means he is the representative of the United States government in all foreign affairs and all ambassadors are accredited to him, and so forth.  Thirdly, fourthly, he's the head of the political party.  Fifth, he's head of the administrative system, which is increasingly making all the decisions.  What will be spent and who will spend it.  In the Bureau of Budget and Management.  And the system in England is even worse.  The Parliament in England now no longer has any control at all over expenditures, and yet they are still teaching in the schools that that is how they got the English Constitution, by control of grants to the Monarchy.  Do you know who is making the decisions in the Bureau of the Budget and Management as to who will get how much?   And he is also the symbol of national unity, the focus of our emotional feeling regarding our country.  This is why it is so difficult to get rid of an incumbent President, either by election or impeachment. 


          But there are other reasons.


          We have a general paralysis of government in the United States to-day, especially in the administrative power, by the very things that we praise:  the so-called rule of law, which should rather be called the rule of lawyers.  Let me give you one example.  It is perfectly clear in the U.S. Constitution that a President can be impeached by a vote of the Congress:  indictment by the House, conviction by the Senate.  It does not require common law procedures; it does not require judicial process.  It is not a judicial action at all.  It is a simple political action.  If you have the votes, he can be removed, simply by counting them.  The horrible thing about the whole Nixon business is that impeachment will never be used again in the history of the United States, because the lawyers in Congress....  Imagine, every member of the judiciary Committee has to be a lawyer, and the Judiciary committee has to recommend that he be impeached.  And have to do all kinds of things that you might do in a court of law if you're accused of holding up a bank.  And the result is that never again will anybody attempt to impeach a President.  It would take years, be indecisive; when you could simply have had a vote and do the whole thing in one morning.  Which is the way it was intended.


          Now, there are a lot of other things in the Constitution which are perfectly obvious, but I can't get any constitutional lawyer to agree with me.  It's perfectly obvious in the Constitution that if the three branches of government couldn't agree, don't do it.  That was the theory was....  No, we have somebody supreme:  the court will make the ultimate decision, and so forth. 


          I'll just touch on something else: secrecy in government.  Secrecy in government exists for only one reason:  to prevent the American people know, from knowing what's going on.  The idea that anything that is going in our government is not known to the Russians about the moment it happens is nonsense.  The minute the President leaves the White House he is in communication.   My farm, ninety miles away from here, I can tell when he has left, because the Federal Communications system begins to operate.  And much of it is buried in the mountains, fifteen miles from me.  And the Russians are listening.  Tune on and get their free message.


          Now, we're getting...   I'll have to forget that.  The dominance of the administrative system and the elections is by private power to-day: [by] money flows and corporation activities.  And I just want to read you a summary from James Willard Hurst[’s] The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States from 1780 to 1970.  He points out that there was powerful anti-corporation feeling in the United States in the day.  And among other things it was established that no corporation could exist by prescription: i.e., they had to have a charter.  That they had to have a limited term of life, and not be immortal.  Corporations to-day are immortal:  they get a charter, they can live forever, and bury us all.  That they have to have a limited purpose, in other words, have a XXXX.  Who is it giving us this bread that's made out of sawdust?   ITT.  International Telegraph and Telephone.  The same corporation that drove Ivar Kreuger to suicide in Paris in April 1931, when it was an international telegraph corporation, controlled by J P. Morgan at that time. 


        I won't take time to read these things, but certain things were established in the United States regarding corporations (of course, it was on the state level, 'cause they controlled the corporations): restricted purpose and activities, especially by banks and insurance companies; prohibition on one corporation to hold the stock of another, without specific statutory grant (we definitely should have that again); limits on the span of the life of the corporation itself, reconst---,  requiring recurrent legislative scrutiny; limits on total assets; XXXX use of limits on new issues of capital, so that the proportion of control of existing stockholders could be maintained; limits on the vote allowed to any stockholder, regardless of the size of his holding; and so forth. 


          By 1890 all of these had been destroyed by judicial interpretation, which extended to corporations -- fictitious persons -- those constitutional rights guaranteed, especially [by] the Fifteenth [actually, should be Fourteenth] Amendment, to living persons.  Because Roscoe Conklin, known as "Turkey Strut Conklin," came to the Supreme Court and he said there were no records kept of the committee of the Senate which drew up the Fifteenth [actually, should be Fourteenth] Amendment.  But he had kept private notes, which showed that they intended the word "person" to include corporations.  It was most convenient.  The corporation which was hiring him to do this suitably rewarded him. 


          Now, we come to the last statement.  And I regret ending on such a, I suppose, a pessimistic [note] -- I'm not personally pessimistic.  The final result will be that the American people will prefer, ultimately, communities.  They will cop out, or opt out, of the system.  Now, it will be a long time.  The system to-day consists of...   Well, I will give it to you.  But.  Everything is a bureaucratic structure, and brainwashed people who are not personalities are trained to fit into this bureaucratic structure and say:  "This was a great life" -- although I would assume that many on their death beds must feel otherwise.  Notice: we are already on a wholesale basis copping out of military service.  We are already on a large scale basis copping out of voting.   An estimate to-night was that the President will probably be chosen by forty percent of the people eligible to vote.  And it's for the fourth time, over sixteen years, the percentage of voters, who are registered, who didn't vote, will be higher.  They also are copping out by no longer paying any attention to newspapers or what's going on, and by increasing emphasis on the growth of localism, what is happening in your own neighborhood. 


          In this pathetic election, I am simply amazed that neither of the candidates has thought about any of the important issues, such as localism, the rights of areas to make their own decisions about what goes on.  Now, I realize that if there's a sulphur mine or a sulphur factory out, a couple of miles away, that you can't do much about it with localism.  But I think you may find with this election one rather extraordinary thing:  a considerable number of people who go to the polls and vote for the local candidate, but do not vote for the President.  Which is the reverse of what it used to be fifty years ago.


          Now, I want to say good night.  Do not be pessimistic.  Life goes on; life is fun.  And if a civilization crashes, it deserves to.  When Rome fell, when Rome fell, the Christian answer was "Create our own communities." 


Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen.




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Carroll Quigley

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